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ARTIFICL4-L MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES':' 
W. David Mor..tgomery 
The concept of transaction costs is a common theme in most analyses 
of the pheno�enon of market failure. Few economists would disagree with 
the abstract proposition that if there exist gains to be made from exchange, 
then in the absence of transaction costs private bargains will take place and 
exhaust all potential gain from trade. This proposition serves not only as a 
characterization of an ideal state of affairs, but as a guide to means by which 
specific cases- of market failure could be remedied. It suggests, in par-· 
ticular, tha� reduction in transaction costs should be examined as a 
potential re=edy. Since the nature and extent of transaction costs 
depend crucially on the institutional structure in which private bargains take 
place, the analysis of the relationship between. institutions and transaction 
costs becomes a primary concern of policy for dealing with market failure. 
The t!:eor y of games has provided notable insights into the nature of 
bargaining processes. In this article I will apply co-operative game theory 
to a specific problem of air pollution control, as a device for designing and 
evaluating 2. set of institutions intended to eliminate certain transaction costs 
which appear to prevent profitable bargains from being consummated. 
In analyzing the relationship between institutions and transaction costs 
it is helpful to break transaction costs down into three broad categories: 
tangible resource costs, social constraints, and strategic breakdowns. 
Snme feeling for the coverage of each of these categories can be conveyed 
through a fanciful example. 
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Consider the case of electrical suppliers who would like to get to­
gether to fix prices. Certain private bargains can lead to gains for all 
participants -- but three separate influences work against their achieve1nent: 
(1) the cost of airplane tickets, hotel accommodations, martinis, and. 
the big mahogany table needed to bring the participants physically 
tog€ther; 
(2) the probability that some outsiders will revoke the agreement and 
punish the participants, and 
(3) the lack of a compelling equilibrium strategy for each participant 
which will take the bargaining process to a stable outcome which ex­
hausts gains from trade. 
The proposition that private bargains will take place and exhaust gains 
from trade when transaction costs are zero is true only if we include all 
three elements in our definition of transaction costs. If -..ve exclude, for 
example, strategic breakdown from consideration as a transaction cost, 
'.Ve v;ill find that some profitable trades do not occur because of bargaining 
deadlock. 
Tangible resource costs can be dealt with in a straightforward manner 
in each specific case. If, for example, it is less expensive for a polluter to 
discover who is affected by his pollution and initiate negotiations than vice 
versa, then assigning rights to sufferers would reduce ti:-ansaction costs 
below what they would be if rights were assigned to polluters. Indeed, 
the introduction of well-defined rights always tends to reduce tangible re­
source costs, by eliminating the need for preliminary negotiations to deter-
mine who has the right to do what. In the analysis which follows it will 
be assumed that well-defined rights are granted, thus eliminating one 
substantial source of transaction costs. 
The second element in transaction costs, social COl'.s:re:.ints, can be 
identified �ith bargains, or aspects of bargains, which a::-e prohibited by 
society. possibly because they violate some ethical or p:::ilit�cal norm. In 
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the game-theoretic analysis these elements will be identified with constraints 
on choice sets fol." coalitions of various participants. Such constraints exist 
even in general formulations of market games. In a market exchange-game, 
for ex2.Inple, each coalition is constrained to allocate commodities among 
its merr:bers in a manner which makes the total of each commodity in the 
final allocation equal to the total in the initial endowment. This amounts to 
the constraint that there be no 11stealing" from some o ther coalition -- a 
constraint which will be in force only if some specific institutions exist. 
The third element in transaction cost, strategic breakdown, has been 
related to institutional design in several papers. The prisoner's dilemma 
is perhaps the most common of the cases in which rational strategies fail to 
exJ1aust gains from trade. In the prisoner's dilemma each player has a 
dominant strategy and, when each player chooses his dominant strategy, the 
outcome is inferior from the point of view of both. It has been shown that 
in particular examples of the prisoner's dilemma game the introduction of 
certain liability rules makes the solutiofi in dominant strategies an optimal 
1 
one. 
Another type of strategic breakdown, particularly relevant to externalities� 
results from "hold-out11 strategies. If a polluter, for exanJ.ple, must obtain 
agree1nent from every person in a geographical area in order to operate, a 
reasonable strategy for each person would be to demand almost all the avail­
able gains from trade, since he holds a veto povver. 2 If each person pursues 
such a strategy, no agreement is likely. 
There is an important difference in terms of impact on tangible resource 
costs and strategic breakdown between institutions which give rise to competitive 
4 
rr:.a:rkets and those which do not. There is a clear practical difference be­
t-�"•een going into a supermarket to buy a bottle of milk and hiring a lawyer 
to negotiate a settlement to a traffic accident. The ability of competitive 
markets and prices to reduce tangible resource costs of information gather­
kg and processing is great. More importantly, in competitive markets with 
large numbers of participants the sttategies which lead to Pareto Optimality 
are Nash equilibrium strategies, and it can be expected that bargains will be 
struck. 
The institution on which the paper focuses is the market in rights to 
pollute. This institution is constructed on an analogy to such arrangements 
as the . market in taxi medallions in New York City. This market seems to 
be a conspicuously succ.essful method of allowing a limited number of operators 
to exploit gains from trade. Any New Yorker will argue that the market is 
harmful to taxi-riders, and because of this fact it is desirable to evaluate such 
a market with certain social constraints on private bargains in mind. In 
particular, the number of licenses issued must reflect these considerations. 
The Failure of Markets in Externalities 
Externalities are commonly cited as a cause of market failure. It is 
instructive to ask if; in the absence of transaction costs broadly defined, 
markets could mediate external effects. Arrow
3 
has answered the question 
by extending the coverage of the general equilibrium theory of competitive 
markets. He argues that when externalities are present we can define new 
commodities, each of which is indexed as an externality of type i, produced 
by actor j and suffered by actor h. When the commodity space is expanded 
in this manner, the competitive equilibrium of the expanded market economy 
is Pareto optimal. 
Transaction costs can be cited as the reason why such expanded markets 
dt· not exist. In many cases, tangible resource costs exceed all conceivable 
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gains from trade on such marl:<.ets under all institutions, and the failures are 
not w·orth remedying through private bargains. In such cases non-market 
allocation mechanisms turn out to offer the only possibility of achieving some 
of the potential gains from trade, although even these may involve such costs 
as to be undesirable. The case which will be examined in this paper is that 
in 'l;f.·h.ich tangible resource costs are negligible, but in which strategic per­
versities or social constraints have prevented the achievement of mutually 
advantageous bargains. Arrow argues that strategic breakdown will be a 
corr1.rn.on phenomenon, since many of the markets in externalities will have only 
two participants, by definition.
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In proving the Pareto Optimality of a market 
system it is assumed that every participant responds as a price-taker, and 
that some mechanism varies prices to clear all markets. If we consider each 
market in an externalify as an isolated system, with but two participants, it 
becomes very unlikely that the price-taker strategy is individually rati onal. 
The standard analysis of the two-person market as a game leads to the 
conclusion that the competitive equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium with only 
two players, since if one participant is a price-taker the best strategy for the 
other player is to become a pri«ce-maker and maximize his utility, subject to 
the other's offer curve. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1. As the 
number of players increases, however, and as long as all are about the same 
size, the competitive equilibrium comes closer to the Nash equilibrium.5 
Therefore, we may find that markets fail to mediate externalities because 
individual strategy choices fail to lead to any agreement on the bargain to be 
struck. If a market in licenses is to exhaust gains from trade it must be 
constructed as a competitive market, having many buyers and sellers. The 
possibility of constructing such a market exists because of the relationship 
of substitutability between many externalities. 
Let us consider that specific market failure which results in the 
phenomenon of air pollution. We could define a market by calling the sulfur 
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dioxide produced by power plant A and suffered by Mr. Jones one corr>�'T:.c:.dity, 
and the sulfur dioxide produced by pov.:er plant B and also suffered by ).�r·. 
Jones another com.rnodity. Each commodity gives rise to a one-to-one mar-
ket, and there is no reason to expect each participant to behave as he would 
in a supermarket. Even if the right to the commodity is clearly defined, the 
question of whether a lawsuit, a guerilla action, or a transfer of money -will 
be the form which the bargain takes is unresolved. Through the introduction 
of appropriately defined rights, however, a competitive market can be induced. 
In this case, the two corrunodities would normally be perfect substitutes 
for Mr. Jones. This offers the hope that a market in a more broadly defined 
commodity, sulfur oxide, will have a competitive equilibrium.. Such a market 
would not only reduce tangible resource costs, but also replace indeterminate 
private bargains, of various forms, with predictable market behavior. 
Rights to Pollute 
Suppose that some q uantity of rights to use the waste disposal capacity 
of the atmosphere is defined. It ·could be, for example, that some regulatory 
agency sets emission standards. Even subsequent to this attempt to deal with 
a market failure, gains from trade may still exist in two dimensions. Pol­
luters and sufferers might achieve mutual benefit from changing the quantity 
of rights held by the polluters, and polluters as a separate group might find 
mutual benefit in rearranging rights among themselves. In this article, a 
game-theoretic model will be constructed and used to design a system for 
e:>..'-ploiting gains from trade among polluters as a separate group. Because 
a redi.iction in air pollution is a public good, it is not yet clear that a market 
system can be used to exploit gains from trade between polluters and sufferers. 
It is assumed that emissio ns of air pollutants can be represented as a 
vector E ;;; (e 1, ···,en) where '1. is the average emission rate of firm i. 
Air quality is represented as a vector of average atmospheric concentrations 
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measured at m points in a region. That is, air quality is a vector 
Q 
= 
(ql, · · · ,  qrn} where qj is air quality at location j. Rights are granted 
in order to achieve a desired air quality Q':'. 
Each firm is assumed to maximize profits. To avoid unnecessary 
detail, it is assumed that prices for all inputs and outputs of firms in the 
system are independent of their activity levels. Under these conditions, 
we can define cost functions Fi(e1), which represent the difference for firm 
i between profits with emissions at some profit-maximizing level �i and 
profits with emission rate ei.
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It is further assumed that emissions are mapped into air quality by a 
meteorological diffusion matrix H, so that E·f.I = Q. The goal of the garne 
is to bring about adoption of an efficient emission vector E�"'1 which rninintlzes 
�Fi(ei) subject to EH_:S Q*. It is assumed throughout that Fi(ei) is twice ' 
differentiable and bounded from below. 
It is assumed that some initial allocation A = (a1, ··",au) of rights to 
use the atmosphere is made. The operational significance to the firm of these 
rights comes down to permission to em.it contaminants into the atmosphere at 
a certain rate. That is, they come down to constraints of the form ei .2 ai 
on the permissible emission levels. Therefore, to any initial alloc'.'ltion of 
rights, there corresponds an initial emission vector which will be adopted if 
no voluntary rearrangement of rights is permitted. Designating the initial 
emission vector E0 = ( e�, • · ·, eg_), firms operating under constraints ei 2:. ai 
will choose ernission levels ep = min (ei• ai). Conversely, to any emission 
vector there corresponds same initial allocation of rights (ta ·individual firms) 
which will lead to its adoption. 
If the initial allocation of rights gives rise to an emission vector E0 f; E�'*"� 
then some other allocation will increase joint profits and still result in adequate 
air quality. It will be shown that it is in fact possible to define rights to use 
the atmosphere and rules regarding their transfer such that voluntary private 
bargains among firms can lead ta the adoption of the efficient emission vector E�'�<_ 
A simple example is useful to help clarify the issues involved. 
Consider- a region containing t\.vo firms and two air quality monitoring 
points, a..'l.d in which cost functions are convex and independent. It is 
10 
possible to show the optimum graphically for this case. In Figure 2, the 
shaded area corresponds to the set of emission vectors v::hich produ.ce at 
least desired air quality. The curves c-c and c'-c' are isacost curves. 
They are contours of the function :Z::Fi(ei), representing those combinations 
i 
of e1 and ez which give rise to the same value of �F(eJ. The further one ' 
goes from the origin, the less cost will be. The shape of the curves follows 
from convexity. The point (e�'*, e�;") at which an is a cost curve is tangent to 
the boundary of the constraint set is the efficient emission vector. Note that 
only one constraint is binding at this point: air pollution is less than the 
level required by the other constraint. 
The corner of the constraint set is the only point at which both con­
straints are satisfied. Because of the shape of the isocost curves, the air 
quality vector associated with this point entails a higher joint total cost than 
does the air quality vector associated with E*':', which gives better air 
quality at one point. 
With the help of this example, some of the problems of allocation and 
exchange of rights can be isolated. Without knowledge of cost functions, it 
is impossible to solve for E�'*. Therefore, it is not likely that the initial 
allocation of rights will lead to E':"' Suppose that the initial allocation is 
such that E0 (in Figure 2) is adopted. It is clear that the total cost of E0 is 
higher than the total cost of E�":', and also that an allocation of rights wh ich 
supports E�'* would be preferred by both parties if firm l (for which e��'<e�) 
were offered adequate compensation by firm 2 (for which e�°'' > ez). Since 
F1(ei":') + F2(e��') < Fi{el) + F2(e2) by hypothesis, it follo\.vs that firm 2 
can offer such a payment (making firm 1 better off than under the initial 
allocation) and remain better off itself. 
The problem is to see how a voluntary re2.rr2.ngement of rights car;. 1.::i::ing 
0 �� about a change from the allocation supporting E to that supporting E 
Rights can be made transferable in nume::.-o-,J.5 ways, not all of '\":hic.'.-i 
have the desirable properties normally associated \i;:ith the competitive 
equilibrium of a market system. A number of s<..:cl: ways of defining a!l.d 
transferring rights will be mentioned, to provide a contrast to the system '\.Vhich 
makes possible market-like behavior. 
The simple rule that any reduction in emission by firm 2 leaves firm 
free to increase its emission by exactly the same amount is not usable. 
Suppose one unit of emission by firm 1 contributes twice as much to pollution 
at point j as does one unit of emission by firm 2. Then, let rights to em.it be 
allocated to the two firms in such a way that if each emits at the maximum 
level allowed by his rights, air quality at point j is just adequate, If firm 2 
sells an emission right to firm l, and if the rights are undifferentiated, air 
pollution at point j will increase to an unsatisfactory level. 
It is only through some such rearrangement of rights that an efficient 
emission vector can be reached; but it is equally clear that in order to 
achieve desired air quality, some restrictions must be put on perrnissible 
rearrangements. Let the restriction be that only those contracts are per­
mitted which reallocate rights in such a -..vay that any emission vector .::::hos en 
'\.vill satisfy the air quality constraints as a whole. In this example, this 
leads to imposing on the joint choice of emission levels (established in the 
contract) the constraints 
hi 1 el + h12ez ::_ q}' 
h1ze1 + hzzez -:=:. q� 
Then, adequate air quality will be preserved and the firms will be able to ar-
rive at a mutually beneficial arrangement -..vhich results in the adoption of the 
emission vector E':'�'. Moreover, their situation has a very natural represen­
tation as a non-constant sum game. 
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In gener::il \.Ve assume that there is a set of n firms in the region, denoted 
I f 1, · · · ,  n1. An ''air quality management system'' is a set of rules for an 
n-person game to be played by the polluting firms in the region. The 
management system first imposes an emissions constraint on each firm. 
In the absence of any binding agreement with others, this emission rate 
must not be exceeded. Second, the management system defines acceptable 
behavior for each and every group of firms. This may involve specifying 
exact emissions for each member, but in general it will involve making a 
requirement thaf certain inequalities must be satisfied by the emission 
vector adopted through the group decision process. It will be shown that 
the process of reaching such a decision can be interpreted as rearranging 
the rights granted to individual firms. 
To formalize the concept of a management system consider the set 
of integers I = f 1, • • . , n} which represents the set of firms. The power 
set of this set is the set of all its subsets. The power set is denoted by y; 
wherel = {[11.[2},···,[n),[l,2},[l ,3},···,[l,2,···,nlf. Thfa set h" 
zn - 1 elements. A management system associates with each coalition a set 
of inequalities which must be satisfied by any emission vector adopted by 
that group for its members. We call this set of inequalities the 11choice 
constraints for coalition S. 11 Thus, in the example where I :: f 1, 2}, a 
management system is represented by the mapping 
fl } 
( 2} 
f 1, 2} 
< 0 el - el 
< 0 ez - ez 
h11e1 + hz1e2 2 
h1ze1 + hzzez S. 
" q1 
q�. 
It is convenient to be able to refer to the "coalition choice set, 11 which is 
the set of emission vectors satisfying the coalition choice constraints. 
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Let Es be a vector having elements \Vhose subscripts run over the 
set S s I. E5 is the projection of some n-dimensional vector E on the sub­
space of dimension S. Now define Q(S) as the set of vectors E8 \vhich satisfy 
the choice constraints for coalition S. An alternative way of defining an air 
quality management system is to define it as the set-valued function O(S). 
Each coalition S Vi'ill be allowed to minimize � F1(ei) subject to the constraint ieS 
E5e0(S). 
The establishment of an initial allocation of rights and the prohibition 
of rearrangements of these rights is a trivial management system. The pro­
hibition can be justified by the fact that some rearrangements of rights can 
result in a degradation of air quality. By setting proper coalition choice con­
straints, however, it is possible to ensure that desired air quality is achieved. 
Indeed, Vie make this a requirement on coalition choice constraints: they 
must be such that, no matter what the coalition structure may be, any per­
mitted choices of emission rates will produce air quality at least as good as 
Q�'. This is not the only requirement, since it is fulfilled even by the system 
which prohibits the formation of coalitions. The second requirement is that 
some coalition or coalitions must be in a position to make choices resulting 
in the adoption of E**, the efficient emissions vector. 
A very simple management system having the::.�c two properties is one 
in which each firm is assigned an initial allocation of rights A {a1, ···,an) 
> 0 giving rise to an initial emission vector EO = (e�, · · · ,  e�) > 0. Then, 
let the management strategy be as follows: if the number of firms in a co­
alition is less than n, each firm must adopt the same emission '\vhich is 
permitted by the initial allocation of rights. For the coalition of the whole, 
coalition chOice constraints are the air quality constraints. 
and for S 
For all SE �I - I} 
I, E·H :5.. Q': 
e. < a. ' - ' 
Formally, 
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This case could also be generated by saying that formation of any 
coalition except the coalition of the "vhole is prohibited. \''le allo'\v re­
allocation of rights only by unanimous consent, and then allo'\v any reallo-
cation producing adequate air quality. This system al'\vays has a non-
empty core. It is, however, a system very prone to deadlock in bar­
gaining. Each participant is in a position to demand almost all the gains 
from trade, because of the requirement of unanimous consent. 
It is also possible to define coalition choice constraints which give 
the management system the form of a market game. The essential feature 
of these choice constraints is- that they make the emissions allowed to any 
coalition a linear combination, identical for all coalitions, of the rights held 
initially by its members. The coalition choice constraints have a 
natural interpretation as requiring that the initial allocation of rights be 
reallocated,within a coalition in a way which preserves their totals. There 
are two modal types of grant: a right to emit and a right to pollute. The 
right to emit will be a scalar, stating the highest average rate of emission 
which is allowed to a firm. The right to pollute is not so simple, since the 
fi,rm directly controls its emissions, not pollution. The firm must adjust 
its emissions so that it does not cause greater pollution at any point than it 
has the right to cause. The right to pollute will have to be specified for 
each location at which air quality is measured. Let qij be the pollution 
caused at point j by firm i, so that hijei = qij . Then if q�j is the amount 
of pollution at p oint j which firm i has a right to cause, the initial allocation 
of rights will have the form of a set of inequalities hij_
ei_ $. q1J· where j = 
1, · · · ,  m, or of the single inequality 
ei < min 
* 
qij 
hij 
I 5 
This allocation has the same abstract form as the allocation of emission 
rights where ei :'.:. ai is the legal restriction. 
We •vill de-:elop a rule, applying to coalitions of any size, for 
forming choice constraints as functions of the initial allocation. The 
suggested rule is that the pollution resulting from any emission policy 
adopted by a coalition must not exceed, at any point, the pollution which 
would be causee: by firms in the coalition if each exercised fully the rights 
granted in the initial allocation. If emission rights are granted, the co­
alition choice constraints are .!: hijei _s;_ .L h1jai. If pollution rights are isS ieS 
granted, the coalition choice constraints are L: hijei :S L: qiJ · We require 
isS ieS 
in addition that the initial allocation satisfy !:q�. :: q�- for pollution rights and 
i lJ J 
�hijai < qj' for emission rights. We can verify the first property £or either ' 
mode of allocating rights by adopting the neutral symbol Cij 
and the convention L::c .. < q1:'. 
i lJ J 
�' qij hijai 
Denote a partition of the set I as D. For any partition I1 \Ve Kr.ow from 
the coalition choice constraints that 
for all Serr. But since 
and 
!: h- .e. < 2: c .. 
ie:S lJ 1 - ieS lJ 
2: I; hijei 
&f1 ie:S 
L; L; C· . 
Se:f1 ie:S 1J 
n 
L; hijei 
i= 1 
n * L; C-. < qj ' i:: l lj -
(I. I I 
I 6 
we conclucle that for any partition, "Vii'>J.ch corresponds to a coalition 
structure, 
� hijei S: qj. ' (!. 2) 
This establishes that no coalition structure can give rise to the Choice 
of an emission vect'or which does not satisfy the air quality constraillts. In 
order to find out whether the coalition choice constraints will allow the 
achievement of efficiency, we must examine how a coalition will choose a 
joint strategy. Any coalition can choose the emission vector in its choice 
set which mi nimizes the sum of its me'mbers' costs. Let us consider the 
coalition of the whole. Its choice constraints are :L;h .. e. < 2:c . . • 
i lJ l - i lJ 
NOw we 
must distinguish again between emission and pollution rights. If pollution 
rights are granted, then 2:ci · :: Lq�j :: q� for all j. Therefore th,e constraints i J i l J 
for the coalition of the whole coincide with the air quality constraints. In 
this case it is possible that a private bargain should be struck among the n 
firms such that the efficient emission vector is adopted. 
If, on the other· hand, emission rights are granted, so that cij = hijai, 
the choice constraints will be �hijei � �hijai. If we require only that ' ' 
�hijai S qJ', the choice constraints for the coalition of the whole will not ' 
necessarily coincide with the air quality constraints. For some allocations 
we can find that �hijai < q;' for some j. In the two firm example (e]' ·, e�) ' 
is such an allocation. In this exarnple the choice constraints for the coalition of 
the whole are 
h 11e1 
0 
+ h2le2 .:S h l l el 
0 h lZe l + hzzez .:S h12e1 
0 + h2le2 
0 
+ hzzez. 
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( 2. l I 
\\�e know that h11e�'>:' + hz1e�* > h1 1e� + h21e� since in Figure Z. t!ie point 
(ei*,e1*> lies above a line with slope equal to -h11/h21 passing through 
(el, ez). Therefo!."e, if constraint 2. 1 is imposed on the coalition cf the 
whole it will be unable to adopt the efficient emission vector. 1,Ve conclude 
that choice constraints of the form L hijei ::;; L. hijai allow the adoption ieS ieS 
of an efficient emission vector only if ai, the initial allocation, is chosen to 
satisfy the equations 1hijai = qj. This condition is, however, very strong, 
and sugg'?:sts that transferable emissions rights are not a practical system 
for encouraging gains from trade. 
The artificial market created by a management system v-·hich defines 
transferable rights will only be capable of exhausting gains from trade for 
all initial allocations of rights if. the rights granted are rights to pollute. 
Therefore, \Ve will consider exclusively those management systems :L(S) 
which define rights to pollute. 
For any number of firms and any initial emissions vector, each member 
of a coalition can be made better off until the agreed emission \"ector mini­
mizes the sum of costs for members of the coalition subject to the choice 
constraints. If E0 is an initial emissions vector, E� is the vector of initial 
emission rates for firms in the coalition S. Let E; be the vector in Q(S) 
which minimizes joint total cost for firms in S. Then 
and 
L; F.(efl > Z: F.(e�'), isS 1 - - isS 1 1 
E [F-(e«J 
iss 1 1 
Fi(e�)]::::;. O. ' 
l 8 
Since it is always possible to find a set of payments which makes every 
member of a coalition better off when the formation of a coalition allows a 
reduction in joint total cost, we can concentrate our attention on the total 
cost reduction which can be achieved by a coalition. We do this by defining 
the characteristic function of the game associated with an air quality manage-
ment system. 
A characteristic function is a mapping from the power set of I into 
the real numbers which has two properties: 
(1) V(¢) = 0 
(2) If R and S are any two disjoint subsets of I, V(R US)� V(R,_) + V(S). 
The characteristic function of a game whose rules are given by a management 
system is defined as 
V(S) L F.(e?) 
iE: s l l 
min L Fi(eil· Ese:n(S) iE:S 
19 
!·�or a coalition S, the characteristic function has the value v>hich equals the 
(F.fference between the sum of the costs incurred by its members if each 
:z..cted independently and the least cost which can be incurred by the group 
Nhen it chooses an emission vector in the coalition choice set. 
The first property of a characteristic function is a m2.tter of definition: 
its value is zero for the empty set. The second must be verified by proving 
that 
min L F1{e.) + 
EssG(S) ie:S i 
min E; F1(e1) 2:. 
EReO(R) ieR 
min 
ER+son(RUSJ 
L: Fi(ei). 
ieRUS 
We will abbreviate the constrained minimum operator min to min. 
E8eO(SJ O(SJ 
Note first that since there are no externalities between firms, the 
."alue of nrin l: Fi(ei) is independent of the choices made by firms not in­
O(S) ieS 
, �Lcded in S. Therefore, the characteristic function is '\Vell-defined. Now 
lefine e�' by 
and 
L. F1(e�') 
ieS 
"'min l: F.{e.) 
O{S) ie:S 1 
1 
L. F1(e:�) 
ieR 1 
min L, F1(ei). O (R J  ioR
Since E� eJ(S) and E�eO(R), 
�lnd 
_L. (hijet - cij) � 0 
>oS 
L: (hijef' - Cij) ::'.S_ 0. 
ieR 
_..\.CC.i-::g t!-:iese t\VO sets of :.r-.e:qualities, we have 
:::, (h. -e':' 
L:.R·�·S. 1J i 
- cij) :S o. 
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Defi:n.i.ng E�u 5 as the vector obtained by combining E� and E;, \Ve conclude 
that E�ussO(RUS}. We c2n separate � F1(ej'.') as follo'\vs: 
ieRUS 
l: Fi(et) 
ie:RU S 
l: F.(et) + L. F-(e1') 
ieS i ieR i 
min L. F1(ei) +min l: Fi(ei). 
[](SJ ieS n(R) ioR 
Si.nee E;USe:O(RUS), 
Therefore, 
min 
:J(RUS) 
tr.in 
O(R,JSJ 
L, F.(e.) < l: F i(e�). 
ieRUS 1 1 - ieRUS 
l: Fi{ei) :s_ 
ieRUS 
min l: Fi(ei) + min 
O(RJ ioR O(SJ 
L, Fi(ei). 
ieS 
This establishes that V(R·_JS) .2::. V(R) + V(S).
\Vhether or not a positive advantage accrues from the formation of 
some coalition depends on whether or not E0 = E*�'. Let us proceed to 
form partitions of the set I by repeated splitting of sets into pairs of dis-
joint subsets, and write 
V(I) 2: V(I - SJ + ,-(S) 2: V(l - SI - SZJ + V(S!J + V(SzJ 2: 
If E0 E :'�' then L.F.(e'.:,�:') 
i 1 l 
�Fi(ep), and V(I) = �V({il ). ' ' 
2: >:V([i] ). 
' 
2 1  
-_-:this case strict equality holds everywhere above, and no coalition can 
;2.in an advantage by fcirming. In this case the characteristic function is 
<:.-:'..C.:.tive and the game is called 11inessential. 11 If E0 f. E�'�', we will not 
:--_;::.ve str ict equality everywhere: then the characteristic function is super-
,s..2.<::itive and the game is called 11essential. 1' 
The proposition that '.vhen the initial emission vector is not efficient 
t..he game is essential implies the proposition that when some initial configu­
ration is not optimal, there exist private bargains which can, in the absence 
of transaction costs, make everyone better off. The procedure used to 
'establish the proposition is, however, informative, It was found first that 
�ether or not private bargains could take place depended on whether or not 
there was a right to contract. It was shown that social constraints led to 
specific restrictions on this right, and that in order to construct a system 
in which ' private bargain ·could achieve an efficient outcome we had to 
define specific rights and rules for their transfer. 
The game derived from the management system will always have a non­
empty core if the cost functions Fi{ei) are convex. It is possible to prove 
.his directly by proving that the game is balanced. because of the theorem that 
"/ a balanced game always has a non-empty core. The demonstration that the 
game is balanced is a straightforward modification of the method used by 
Scarf, 8 and is placed in an Appendix. 
We can prove a deeper result, that the game is a market game. Theorem 
II in the Appendix verifies that the game is totally balanced. 
Since a game is a market game if and only if it is totally b_alanced, 
the management game is a market game, as defined by Shapley and Shubik. 
'7!1e validity of interpreting the coalition choice constraints as the definition 
r, .- allowable rearrangements of rights is confirmed by the proof that the 
r;:a.1agement system gives rise to a market game. 
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We can indeed go further, fo'r this co-operative market game can be 
decomposed into a competitive ma·rket. Vie can break up the coalition choice 
constraints into "budget" constraints on each firm. Define Jij as a quantity 
of rights to cause pollution at point j held by firm i, and f�. as the firm's >J 
initial allocation of these rights. Some enforcement mechanism is needed 
to ensure th3.t each firm observes the following budget constraints relating 
its emissions and license holdings: 
hijei � £ij · (j l,· · · ,m) 
Each firm can buy and sell rights at prices Pj to be established by the 
market. Then the. firm will minimize 
Fi(e.) + :Epj(fij - f?.) l j lJ 
subject to the "budget" constraint. If L £� qj', the equilibrium prices, 
license holdings and emission rates in the market are such that L:F-(e.) 
i 1 l 
is minimized subject to EH::;_ Q�'. lO 
This is a competitive market with many buyers and sellers of rights. 
We have a predictive theory which asserts that its equilibrium will be 
achieved. If conditions under which price-taking is a rational strategy were 
not created by the specification of rights, there would be no such assurance. 
Among the many ways to define the right to contract, one leads to a pre-
dictable, efficient outcome. 
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Appendix 
Definition. A balanced collection of sets is a collection T for which 
ther-e exists a.measure 1).-· such that 0 > 0 and s s -
z a, = 1. 
&T 
, 
s�1µ 
Definition. A game is balanced if for every balanced collection of 
coalitions T a vector ('11' i • · • • • ,,. n) 
E iri $. V(S) for all Se: T. 
ieS 
satisfies :;: tri s_ V(I) wheneve·r 
' 
Theorem I. The game associated with an air quality management system 
is balanced. 
Proof. Consider a vector (1f1, • · • ,1Tn) such that
E iri < E F1(e?) - min E F1(e1) ie:S -:-- ieS 1 O(S) ieS 
for all S in some arbitrary balanced collection T. For each coalition S there 
exists an emission vector E5 such that E F1(e�) = min E F1{e1). and 
ieS 1 O(S) ie:S 
and 
E �-e'.3 < :E C•· 
ie:S J 1 - ieS lJ 
E 1Ti, .<· E [ F1(e?) - F1(e�) ]. i€S -iE:S 1 1 
y,�e must prove that there exists a vector E such that 
and 
Lh .. e. < L:ciJ
. 
i l.J 1 - i 
L1T· :5. L[Fi(e?) - Fi(ei) ]. i 1 i 1 
I 1 I Define e. ' E SeT 
S:o [i} 
6 sef. 
Therefore � l\jei = ' E[h-· E i lJ &T 
05e�] ' 
n 
E 
i= 1 
S:o [ i} 
:E Oshije� SeT 
S::i � i} 
L L 6 h- -e� 
ie:S Se T s lJ 1 
L 6 L h· -e� 
Se:T s isS 1J 1•
Since L h. -e{ < L c . ., 
isS lJ - isS 1J 
E 65 
SeT 
s 2: h ijei :::;_ :E Os 
isS SeT 
:E cij• 
ieS 
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But :E 5 :E cij 
SsT s ieS 
n 
I: cii L 0 s 
i:::l " SE:T $'.:) £ i 1 
n 
L c ... 
i= 1 lJ 
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Therefore, ei defined as in this proof satisfies the choice constraints for the 
coalition I. 
(2) By convexity and the definition of 55, 
:E OsFi{ef) 
SeT 
S:o ( i1 
?. Fi( :E 65e�), 
SeT 
S:o [ i} 
and by definition ei E SeT 
S:o [ i) 
s 
Osei· 
Therefore L 
SeT 
S:o (i} 
0 F.{e�) > F.(e;), s 1 1 - 1 .. 
and 
n 
o) � (F1(ei i= 1 :E 05Fi(
e�)] � 
SeT 
S:o [ i) 
n 
:E [F.(e9) - Fi(e.) ]. i= 1 l 1 1 
By assumption 
E tr- < E [F.(e?) - F.(e�)]. 
ieS i
 - i£S i i i i 
For each S, we can multiply both sides of the inequality by 6 5 and preserve 
the sense of the inequality. Therefore 
:E Os _:E Tri :S :E 05 _L [Fi(ef) - Fi(ef}]. SeT 1eS SE:T 1E:S 
But 
and 
z 6 = ... = L: 
SeT s ieS 1 SsT 
L 1) S TI i ieS 
n 
L L 0 s "ii= I SeT 
S:o ( i} 
n 
L rr. 
i= 1 l 
L 
SeT 
S:o ( i} 
L 6 ">' [ F-(e9) - F·r{·5'] 
Se:T s i€°S i i i i, 
os 
n 
L "i• i= 1 
n s L L 65 [Fi(ef )  - F.(ei)] i = l  SeT 1 
S:o[i] 
n n 
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L L 0 F-(e9) - L 
i= l SeT 5 i 1 i=l
L &sF1(e� )  
SeT 1 
S:o [ i] 
n n 
L F.(e9) - L 
i= 1 1 1 i= 1 
S:o[i] 
L OsFi{ef). SeT 
S:o [i} 
Therefore, 
n 
L "i :5 i= l 
:5 
n o L [Fi{ei) i:: 1 
n 
I: 6sFi(ei)] sa 
S::i f i} 
L [ Fi(ef) - Fi(e.) ]. i= 1 1 
l7 
Definition. A game iS totally balanced if the game formed by replacing 
the set of players I \vith ar:.y subset R.£ I is also balanced. 
Theorem II. The game derived from the management system is totally 
balanced. 
Proof. Immediate by replacing I by R in Theorem I, and letting T be 
a balanced collection of subsets of R. 
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Footnotes 
�'This article draws on material included in my doctoral disserta­
tion, "lvfarket Systems for the Control of Air Pollution," submitted 
to the Department of Economics at Harvard University. A lengthier 
version was presented at the Annual Ivfeeting of the Public Choice 
Society in May 1972. I am indebted to Kenneth Arrow, Walter Isard, 
James Krier and Charles Plott for suggestions and criticisms, and 
to the Environmental Quality Laboratory of the California Institute of 
Technology for research support. 
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